Contents / Set Theory / Independence & Forcing
Chapter 5
Independence & Forcing
Why every independence result is conditional on the consistency of ZFC, via Godel's second theorem; the constructible universe, its definable well-ordering and its absoluteness; forcing posets, dense sets and generic filters, with the Cohen conditions proved dense and the generic real proved different from every ground-model real; the continuum hypothesis settled by Godel and Cohen; inaccessible cardinals giving models of ZFC and so unprovable in it; measurable implies inaccessible; and the consistency-strength ladder.
Introduction
Every other chapter of mathematics answers questions. This one explains why some questions have no answer — not "no answer yet", but provably no answer from the axioms we have agreed to use.
The question that forced the issue is Cantor's. He proved that is uncountable, so , and then asked whether there is a set of reals whose size falls strictly between and . His guess — that there is not — is the continuum hypothesis, and it stood first on Hilbert's 1900 list. It took sixty-three years and two completely different inventions to settle, and the settlement was not "yes" or "no". Gödel showed in 1938 that CH cannot be refuted from the axioms of ZFC, by exhibiting a sparse inner universe in which it holds. Cohen showed in 1963 that CH cannot be proved from them either, by inventing forcing, a method for enlarging a model of set theory in a controlled way until CH fails. Between them, CH is independent.
Two techniques run through everything here, and they are exact mirror images. An inner model is built by throwing sets away: keep only the sets some construction can name, and you obtain a thinner universe which still satisfies every axiom, but in which the continuum has had no room to grow. A forcing extension is built by adding sets: choose a partially ordered set of finite approximations, adjoin an idealised object that no approximation alone describes, and check that the axioms survive. Thinning gives consistency of CH; fattening gives consistency of its negation. Neither can decide CH, and that is the theorem.
A warning about the shape of the arguments. Nothing in this chapter proves CH, or CH, or the consistency of ZFC. Everything is relative: statements of the form "if ZFC is consistent, then so is ZFC + CH". Gödel's second incompleteness theorem forbids anything stronger, and one section below derives exactly why. Keeping the conditional visible is not pedantry — it is the difference between a correct theorem and a claim that is provably false.
Throughout, ZFC is Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with choice, ZF is the same without choice, is the class of ordinals, is the cumulative hierarchy, and abbreviates the arithmetical sentence asserting that the theory proves no contradiction. Lower-case always denote conditions in a forcing poset; always denotes a ground model; always denotes a generic filter.
5.1Independence: what the word means
Independence is a statement about a theory, not about a mathematical object. It says that a particular list of axioms does not settle a particular question, and it is proved by producing two worlds that obey the axioms and disagree about the question.
Definition 5.1 (Independence). Let be a first-order theory and a sentence in its language. We say is independent of if
Equivalently, decides if it proves one of the two, and is independent exactly when does not decide it.
Written this way, independence is a claim about the non-existence of a proof, and non-existence claims about proofs are hopeless to attack directly: there are infinitely many candidate derivations and no way to inspect them all. The whole subject rests on converting the claim into a claim about models, where ordinary mathematical construction can get a grip.
Theorem 5.2 (Independence is a statement about models). Let be consistent. Then is independent of if and only if both and have models.
Proof. Suppose first that both and have models. If then is true in every model of , by soundness; but the model of is a model of in which fails, a contradiction. So , and the symmetric argument with the model of gives . Hence is independent.
Conversely, suppose is independent of . If had no model then, by Gödel's completeness theorem in its contrapositive form — a theory with no model is inconsistent — the theory would be inconsistent, so , and by the deduction theorem , contradicting independence. So has a model, and likewise .∎
The proof used the completeness theorem in exactly one direction and soundness in the other, and it is worth being explicit about which does what. Soundness ("provable implies true in all models") is what lets a single model refute a proof. Completeness ("consistent implies satisfiable") is what lets a failure to prove be witnessed by a model. Without completeness, building models would establish nothing about provability.
Intuition. Think of the axioms as the rules of a board game and as a question about how a game can end. Independence means the rulebook permits both endings. Nobody is cheating in either play-through; the rulebook is simply silent, and no amount of re-reading it will produce an answer. To decide the question you must adopt a new rule — and then the interesting question becomes which new rule deserves to be adopted.
Example 5.3 (Independence outside set theory). Show that the sentence "for all , " is independent of the axioms of group theory.
Solution.
- The abelian group is a model of the group axioms in which commutativity holds.
- The symmetric group is a model of the group axioms in which it fails, since .
- Two models of the axioms disagree about the sentence, so by the theorem Independence is a statement about models the sentence is independent of group theory.
- Note how ordinary this is. Independence is only startling for set theory because we expected ZFC to be a description of one fixed universe rather than a list of constraints admitting many.
Remark. The group-theoretic example also shows what independence does not mean. It does not mean the question is meaningless, nor that it has no answer in any particular group. Every specific group either is or is not abelian. Likewise, if one believes in a single intended universe of sets, CH has a definite truth value there; independence says only that ZFC does not pin it down.
5.2Gödel and Cohen: the two halves of the answer
The independence of CH was proved in two installments, twenty-five years apart, by methods with nothing in common except the goal.
Theorem 5.4 (Gödel, 1938: the consistency of CH). If ZF is consistent, then so is . Formally, the implication
is a theorem of ZF — indeed of a very weak fragment of arithmetic.
Remark (Outline, not a proof — what it assumes and where the details live). The full argument cannot fit in a chapter, and the honest thing is to say so and name its moving parts. It goes: define by transfinite recursion the class of constructible sets; prove in ZF that satisfies every ZF axiom (this is a check of eight axioms, each a separate closure argument); prove that carries a definable well-ordering, which gives AC inside ; prove the condensation lemma, that an elementary submodel of collapses to some ; deduce from condensation that every constructible subset of appears by stage , which gives CH in , and the same argument one level up gives GCH. What is assumed is only ; what is produced is a model, namely as computed inside any model of ZF. The details occupy roughly a chapter of Kunen's Set Theory or Jech's Set Theory, chapter 13. Sections below prove the parts that are genuinely short — transitivity of , the increasing hierarchy, the definable well-ordering — and label the rest as quoted.
Theorem 5.5 (Cohen, 1963: the consistency of the negation of CH). If ZFC is consistent, then so is . More precisely, for any cardinal of the ground model with there is a forcing extension in which .
Remark (Outline, not a proof — what it assumes and where the details live). Take a countable transitive model of (enough of) ZFC; force with the poset of finite partial functions from to ; the generic filter codes distinct reals; the poset has the countable chain condition, so cardinals are preserved and is still a cardinal in the extension; a counting argument on nice names bounds from above by . The assumptions are and the forcing theorem, stated below and itself quoted. Cohen's original papers are the 1963 and 1964 PNAS notes; the modern treatment is Kunen, chapters IV–VII.
Putting the two together is immediate, and the combination is what the word independence refers to in practice.
Corollary 5.6 (CH is independent of ZFC). If ZFC is consistent, then CH is independent of ZFC.
Proof. Assume . By the theorem Gödel, 1938: the consistency of CH, the theory is consistent, hence has a model by completeness. By the theorem Cohen, 1963: the consistency of the negation of CH, the theory is consistent, hence also has a model. Two models of ZFC disagree about CH, so by the theorem Independence is a statement about models, CH is independent of ZFC.∎
Intuition. Gödel and Cohen move in opposite directions from the same starting point. Gödel shrinks the universe until the only subsets of left are the ones a formula can describe, and there are exactly of those; CH becomes true by starvation. Cohen grows the universe by pouring in new reals that no formula of the old universe describes; CH becomes false by flooding. Neither move breaks an axiom, which is the entire content of both theorems.
Remark. Cohen received the Fields Medal in 1966 for forcing — still the only one awarded for work in mathematical logic. The method turned out to be far more general than the problem that prompted it: within a decade it had settled Suslin's hypothesis, the Whitehead problem, the Kaplansky conjecture on Banach algebras, and Borel's conjecture, and today a set theorist meeting a new combinatorial question about expects independence as the default outcome.
5.3The formal framework: theories, models and consistency
Before any of this can be made precise we need to be careful about a distinction that independence arguments live or die by: the difference between working in a theory and reasoning about it.
Definition 5.7 (Consistency and its arithmetisation). A theory is consistent if there is no sentence with and . When is recursively axiomatised, the relation " is a -proof of " is decidable, so it can be expressed by a formula of arithmetic, and
is a single arithmetical sentence. Because it is arithmetical, is the kind of thing a theory can prove or fail to prove about itself.
That last sentence is the hinge. Gödel numbering turns a claim about proofs into a claim about natural numbers, and a theory strong enough to talk about natural numbers is thereby strong enough to talk about itself. The consequence is the central limitation of the subject.
Theorem 5.8 (Gödel's second incompleteness theorem). Let be a consistent, recursively axiomatised theory interpreting a modest amount of arithmetic (Robinson's suffices, and ZFC vastly exceeds it). Then
Remark (Outline, not a proof — what it assumes and where the details live). The argument constructs by the diagonal lemma a sentence with , so says "I am not provable". The first incompleteness theorem shows when is consistent. One then verifies that this proof can itself be carried out inside , which requires the Hilbert–Bernays–Löb derivability conditions on , and obtains . Since , it follows that . What is assumed is the derivability conditions, whose verification is a long but routine formalisation; the standard reference is Boolos, The Logic of Provability, or Hájek–Pudlák.
The consequence we actually need is immediate, and it is what makes every theorem in this chapter conditional.
Corollary 5.9 (ZFC cannot prove its own consistency). If ZFC is consistent, then .
Proof. ZFC is recursively axiomatised — its axioms are the finitely many individual axioms together with two decidable schemes — and it interprets arithmetic, since the finite von Neumann ordinals with their induced operations form a model of Peano arithmetic inside ZFC. So ZFC meets the hypotheses of the theorem Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and if it is consistent then it does not prove .∎
Corollary 5.10 (No absolute consistency proof for a set theory). If ZFC is consistent, then ZFC does not prove that there exists a model of ZFC.
Proof. Reason inside ZFC. Suppose ZFC proved the sentence "there exists a set and a relation on it with ". The completeness theorem is provable in ZFC, and one of its consequences — soundness in the arithmetised form — gives that the existence of a model of a theory implies the consistency of that theory. Hence ZFC would prove , contradicting the corollary ZFC cannot prove its own consistency.∎
This is the reason the phrase "ZFC proves that CH is independent" is, read literally, false, and it is worth stating the correct version once, sharply, because almost every informal account of the subject gets it wrong.
Proposition 5.11 (What an independence theorem actually asserts). The sentence "CH is independent of ZFC" is not a theorem of ZFC. What is a theorem of ZFC is the implication
Equivalently, the theory proves that CH is independent of ZFC.
Proof. Independence of CH implies in particular that , that is, it implies . So if ZFC proved the independence of CH outright, ZFC would prove , which the corollary ZFC cannot prove its own consistency forbids (assuming ZFC consistent). The positive half is the corollary CH is independent of ZFC, whose proof assumed exactly and used nothing else beyond ZFC.∎
Pitfall. "Cohen proved CH is false" and "Gödel proved CH is true" are both wrong, and they are wrong in the same way: each takes a relative consistency result and reads it as a truth claim. Cohen produced a model where CH fails. Gödel produced a model where it holds. Neither model is distinguished as the real universe by anything either man proved.
Example 5.12 (Reading a relative consistency statement). The literature contains the statement . Which direction does this go, and why is the converse not available?
Solution.
- The stated implication says: if the stronger theory has no contradiction, neither does the weaker. That direction is trivial in one sense — any model of the stronger theory is a model of ZFC — and it is provable in weak arithmetic by transforming a ZFC-contradiction into a contradiction of the stronger theory.
- The converse would say . This is not provable, because, as shown below in the corollary ZFC cannot prove an inaccessible exists, an inaccessible yields a model of ZFC and hence gives ; the converse implication would therefore let prove , violating the second incompleteness theorem applied to that theory.
- The asymmetry is exactly what the phrase consistency strength names. Final point: implications go downward in strength for free and upward never.
5.4A catalogue of independent statements
CH is the famous case, but it is not an isolated pathology. Once forcing was available the list grew quickly, and it now covers questions from general topology, algebra, analysis and combinatorics that were posed with no suspicion that logic was involved.
Definition 5.13 (The continuum and its cardinal). Write for the cardinality of the continuum. The continuum hypothesis CH is the sentence ; the generalised continuum hypothesis GCH is the sentence for every ordinal .
Here is a representative sample of statements independent of ZFC, chosen to show the range.
- Suslin's hypothesis. Every complete dense linear order without endpoints in which every family of disjoint intervals is countable is isomorphic to . It fails in , where a Suslin tree can be constructed from , and holds under Martin's axiom plus CH.
- The Whitehead problem. Every abelian group with is free. Shelah proved in 1974 that it holds under and fails under MA CH — the first independence result to land squarely inside mainstream algebra.
- The Borel conjecture. Every strong measure zero set of reals is countable. Laver forced it in 1976; it fails under CH.
- Kaplansky's conjecture. Every algebra homomorphism from into a Banach algebra is continuous. Solovay and Woodin showed the answer depends on the model.
- . By the theorem Cohen, 1963: the consistency of the negation of CH this is consistent, as is , but not — see the theorem König's restriction on the continuum below.
Example 5.14 (Which values of the continuum are excluded). Among , , , , which can consistently equal ?
Solution.
- : yes, this is CH, consistent by Gödel.
- : yes, by Cohen forcing with , which has uncountable cofinality.
- : no. Its cofinality is , and the theorem König's restriction on the continuum proved below rules out .
- : yes. Its cofinality is , so it is a permitted value.
- Final answer: all except .
Remark. The pattern is worth noticing. Statements about definable or small objects — arithmetic, Borel sets, compact metric spaces — tend to be decided by ZFC. Statements that quantify over arbitrary subsets of , or over arbitrary structures of size , tend to be independent. Forcing is a technique for moving exactly those objects around while leaving the arithmetic of the ground model untouched.
5.5Constructible sets: building a universe out of definitions
Gödel's model is obtained by replacing the power-set operation with something far stingier. At each stage, instead of taking all subsets of what has been built, take only the subsets that a first-order formula can single out using parameters already present.
Definition 5.15 (The definable power set). Let be a set. The definable power set of is
Only formulas with quantifiers ranging over itself are allowed, and only parameters drawn from .
Definition 5.16 (The constructible hierarchy). Define by transfinite recursion
and set . Members of are the constructible sets, and abbreviates the sentence "every set is constructible".
Intuition. takes every subset, including the ones nobody can describe; takes only the describable ones. The two hierarchies agree at the finite stages, because every subset of a finite set is definable by listing its members. They part company at stage : has members, while has only , since there are only countably many formulas with parameters from the countable set .
The first two facts about the hierarchy are the ones every later argument uses, and both are short.
Proposition 5.17 (The hierarchy is increasing and each level is transitive). For all ordinals we have , and every is a transitive set with .
Proof. We prove by induction on that is transitive and that ; the general monotonicity then follows by a second induction on .
Base. is transitive vacuously.
Successor. Assume is transitive. First, : given , transitivity gives , and is defined over by the formula with the parameter . So . Next, is transitive: any satisfies by definition of , and as just shown, so .
Limit. If is a limit and each for is transitive, then is a union of transitive sets, hence transitive; and by the successor argument applied to .
For monotonicity, fix and induct on : the case is trivial, the successor step is , and at a limit we have directly from the definition of the union.∎
Corollary 5.18 ( is a transitive class containing every ordinal). is transitive, and for every ordinal ; consequently .
Proof. Transitivity: if then for some , and is transitive by the proposition The hierarchy is increasing and each level is transitive, so .
For the ordinals, induct on . Suppose for all . Since the hierarchy is increasing, for every , so . Now being an ordinal — being transitive and linearly ordered by — is expressible by a formula whose quantifiers can be restricted to any transitive set, and is transitive, so
exhibits as a member of , using the parameter once it is known that ; alternatively, and without parameters, , because an easy induction shows the ordinals in are exactly those below .∎
Example 5.19 (The first few levels). Compute and their cardinalities.
Solution.
- , so .
- . The only subset of is itself, definable by . So and .
- . Both subsets and are definable over a one-element set, so and .
- where ; every one of the subsets of a two-element set is definable with parameters, so .
- In general for finite , because on a finite set every subset is definable: the pattern is . Final answer: has cardinality for .
Proposition 5.20 (Finite levels agree with the cumulative hierarchy). For every we have , and hence is the set of hereditarily finite sets.
Proof. Induct on . Both are empty at . Suppose ; this set is finite, since starting from . Every subset of a finite transitive set is definable over : writing , the formula with parameters defines it, and is defined by . Hence for finite , giving . Taking unions at gives .∎
Pitfall. , and the failure is total: has size , while is countable. The equality is a purely finite phenomenon and evaporates at the first infinite stage.
5.6Properties of : absoluteness and the definable well-ordering
Two features make useful. It is canonical: the construction, performed inside any model of ZF, yields the same thing again when performed inside its own output. And it is orderly: the construction hands you a well-ordering for free, so AC is not an extra assumption inside but a consequence.
Definition 5.22 (Absoluteness). Let be transitive classes. A formula is absolute between and if for all ,
A formula is if all its quantifiers are bounded, of the form or ; every formula is absolute between transitive classes.
Theorem 5.23 ( holds inside ). The construction of the hierarchy is absolute: for every transitive class satisfying ZF and containing all ordinals, and every ordinal , the set computed inside equals the real . Consequently , and .
Proof. The function is defined by transfinite recursion from the operation . Two things must be checked, and both are checks on complexity rather than on set theory.
First, is absolute between transitive models of ZF. Satisfaction for a set structure, , is defined by recursion on the finite formula coded as a hereditarily finite object; the recursion only ever quantifies over subsets of and over elements of , and its defining formula can be written in form relative to parameters. Hence any transitive model of ZF computes the satisfaction relation of correctly, and therefore computes correctly. Note carefully that this is not the same as absoluteness of , which fails badly; is a set of subsets each of which is described by a formula, and describing is absolute while collecting all subsets is not.
Second, transfinite recursion is absolute when the underlying operation is and the model contains all ordinals. By induction on : if computes correctly for all , then at a successor it applies the absolute operation to a correct input, and at a limit it takes a union, which is absolute. Since has all ordinals, no stage is missed.
Applying this with — which is transitive by the corollary is a transitive class containing every ordinal, contains all ordinals, and satisfies ZF — gives for all , hence . So every set of is constructible from the point of view of , that is, .∎
The payoff is that can be adopted as an axiom without cost: it holds in a model that ZF builds for itself. The next theorem says that adopting it also buys choice.
Theorem 5.24 ( satisfies the axiom of choice). There is a formula , with no parameters, which defines in a well-ordering of the whole class . Consequently , and indeed "there is a definable well-ordering of the universe".
Proof. We construct by recursion on levels, well-ordering each and arranging that each ordering extends the previous ones.
Fix a recursive enumeration of all first-order formulas in the language of set theory, in order of their Gödel numbers. Suppose is a well-ordering of . Every element of arises as
for at least one pair consisting of an index and a finite tuple from . Assign to the -least such description, where descriptions are compared first by the index , then — among equal indices — by the tuple in the lexicographic order induced by on tuples of a fixed finite length, shorter tuples preceding longer ones. This is a well-ordering of the set of descriptions, being a finite lexicographic product of well-orderings, so a least description exists.
Now define on by: elements of come first, ordered by ; then the elements of , ordered by their least descriptions. Each piece is a well-ordering and the second is placed entirely after the first, so the sum is a well-ordering, and it extends by construction.
At a limit set . This is a linear order since the form a chain under extension. It is a well-ordering: a nonempty meets some with , and the -least element of is -least in , because every element of outside was placed after all of .
Finally put if and only if appears before in for the least with . The whole recursion is given by a single formula, so is definable without parameters, and by the theorem holds inside it is computed the same way inside .
For AC: given a set of nonempty sets, the function sending each to its -least element is definable from and , and satisfies enough of ZF to form it as a set. It is a choice function on . Hence .∎
Intuition. The well-ordering comes from bookkeeping, not from magic. Every constructible set was built by some formula applied to some earlier sets, so tag each set with the cheapest recipe that produces it and sort by recipe. In this is impossible because most sets have no recipe at all; in , having a recipe is the definition of membership.
Proposition 5.25 (Levels of have the size of their index). For every infinite ordinal , .
Proof. By induction. At : by the proposition Finite levels agree with the cumulative hierarchy, which is countably infinite, and .
Successor step. Suppose with infinite. Each element of is determined by a formula together with a finite tuple from . There are countably many formulas and finite tuples, using the standard fact that for infinite . So . The reverse inequality holds because .
Limit step. For limit , , and again gives the reverse.∎
Example 5.26 (Why is not obviously small). If , how can contain all the reals of any model in which holds?
Solution.
- Under every real is constructible, and the condensation lemma shows each constructible subset of appears in some with .
- Hence , a set of size by the proposition Levels of have the size of their index.
- So there are at most reals in , and at least since always. Therefore , which is CH.
- Final answer: is small in cardinality but complete as a universe — it has all the reals it believes exist, because it does not believe in the others.
5.7Relative consistency via inner models
The reason to build is the following transfer principle, which is the template for every inner-model consistency proof.
Theorem 5.27 (The inner model method). Suppose is a definable transitive class, containing all ordinals, and ZF proves " " for a theory . Then
and this implication is itself provable in a weak arithmetical theory.
Proof. Argue contrapositively and syntactically, which is what keeps the argument finitary. Suppose is inconsistent, so there is a finite derivation of from finitely many axioms of . By hypothesis ZF proves for each , where denotes the relativisation of to . Relativisation commutes with the rules of first-order logic: if follows from by a rule, then follows from by the same rule, provided is nonempty — which it is, since it contains the ordinals. Translating the derivation of term by term therefore yields a derivation of , which is , from . Since ZF proves each of those, ZF proves . Hence ZF is inconsistent. Contraposing gives the statement, and every step was a finite manipulation of finite derivations, so the whole argument formalises in primitive recursive arithmetic.∎
Corollary 5.28 (Gödel's consistency results). implies , and implies .
Proof. is a definable transitive class containing all ordinals, by the corollary is a transitive class containing every ordinal. ZF proves that satisfies every axiom of ZF — this is the eight-axiom verification quoted in the outline of the theorem Gödel, 1938: the consistency of CH — and ZF proves by the theorem satisfies the axiom of choice, and by the theorem holds inside . Now apply the theorem The inner model method with and with .∎
Remark. Notice what this buys and what it does not. It shows that adding AC to ZF cannot create a contradiction that was not already there, so a mathematician who uses choice is taking no new logical risk. It does not show AC is true, and it does not produce a model of ZF from nothing — it converts a hypothetical model of ZF into a model of ZFC.
Example 5.29 (Transferring a consistency result). Assume it is known that ZF proves " ". Deduce that is consistent relative to ZF, and explain why one may not conclude that GCH is true.
Solution.
- is definable, transitive and contains all ordinals; ZF proves satisfies ZFC, and by assumption also GCH.
- The theorem The inner model method with gives .
- Truth is a different matter: the argument produces a model where GCH holds, and the forcing results produce models where it fails. A sentence true in one model of ZFC and false in another is not settled by ZFC.
- Final answer: consistency transfers; truth does not.
5.8What cannot do
If settled every question, set theory would be finished: adopt and compute. The reason nobody does is that is too thin to be plausible, and it is thin in a way that can be made precise.
Proposition 5.30 ( decides too much). proves CH, GCH, the diamond principle , the existence of a Suslin tree, the existence of a well-ordering of the reals, and the failure of every large cardinal axiom from measurables upward.
Remark (Quoted, not proved here). Each item is a substantial theorem. CH and GCH come from condensation, as outlined for the theorem Gödel, 1938: the consistency of CH; is Jensen's refinement of that argument, and a Suslin tree is built from by a transfinite construction of length ; the well-ordering is from the theorem satisfies the axiom of choice restricted to reals, with the complexity computed from the absoluteness of the construction; the failure of large cardinals is the theorem of Scott quoted immediately below. The point being made is structural: is not a modest extra axiom, it is a decision to work in the smallest universe compatible with the ordinals, and it settles essentially every question about which set theorists have an opinion — usually in the direction those opinions reject.
Theorem 5.31 (Scott: a measurable cardinal implies ). If there exists a measurable cardinal, then .
Remark (Outline, not a proof — what it assumes and where the details live). From a measurable one forms the ultrapower by a -complete nonprincipal ultrafilter on ; completeness makes the ultrapower well-founded, so it collapses to a transitive class with a nontrivial elementary embedding having critical point . If held, then as well by absoluteness of the construction, and one derives a contradiction by considering the least ordinal moved: but elementarity forces to fix the -structure below, and comparing the -th element of a definable sequence on both sides gives . The assumptions are the existence of and Łoś's theorem for ultrapowers; the details are in Jech, chapter 17.
Intuition. is built from below by definitions, and a measurable cardinal is a statement of reflection so strong that no definition-by-recursion from below can produce its measure. Scott's theorem is the first sign that the large cardinal hierarchy and the constructible hierarchy pull in genuinely opposite directions: you can have a sharp knife or a thin universe, not both.
Example 5.32 (Why "just take " is not a solution to CH). A student proposes settling CH by decree: adopt as a new axiom, since it is consistent and it proves CH. Give two reasons set theorists reject this.
Solution.
- It is arbitrary. is consistent, but so is , and so is CH. Consistency alone never selects an axiom; otherwise one could equally decree CH by adopting a forcing axiom.
- It is restrictive. By the theorem Scott: a measurable cardinal implies , adopting refutes every large cardinal from a measurable upward, and hence discards the axioms which have the best claim to being natural extensions of ZFC and which settle definable questions about the reals in a coherent way.
- Final answer: the two objections are arbitrariness and restrictiveness, and the second is the one that actually moved the field toward large cardinals and forcing axioms instead.
5.9Forcing posets: conditions as partial information
Forcing starts from a very plain object: a partially ordered set whose elements are thought of as finite pieces of information about an object we intend to create. The order encodes refinement. Everything else is machinery for making "an object compatible with infinitely many pieces at once" into a legitimate set.
Definition 5.33 (Forcing poset). A forcing poset is a partially ordered set with a largest element . Elements of are called conditions. We read as " is stronger than ", meaning carries all the information in and possibly more.
Pitfall. The order convention is upside down relative to intuition: smaller conditions are stronger, that is, more informative. Some authors (notably in the Israeli tradition) use the opposite convention. Always check which one a text uses before reading a single proof.
Definition 5.34 (Compatibility and antichains). Conditions are compatible if some satisfies and ; otherwise they are incompatible, written . A set is an antichain if its elements are pairwise incompatible. The poset has the countable chain condition (ccc) if every antichain in is countable.
Definition 5.35 (Dense sets). A set is dense if for every there is with . It is dense below if every has an extension in . It is open if implies .
Intuition. A condition is a promise: "the object I am building will look like this so far." Compatibility means two promises can be kept together. A dense set is a demand that can always be met: no matter what you have promised, you can promise a little more and satisfy the demand. Forcing works because meeting all the demands at once produces an object no single promise described.
Example 5.36 (Finite partial functions). Let be the set of finite partial functions ordered by reverse inclusion, iff . Identify , decide when two conditions are compatible, and give an infinite antichain.
Solution.
- The largest element is the empty function , since every extends it; it promises nothing.
- and are compatible if and only if they agree on : if they agree, is a function and is a common extension; if they disagree at some , no function can extend both.
- An infinite antichain: for let be the condition with domain taking value at and value at . Any two of these disagree at the smaller of their two top indices, so they are pairwise incompatible.
- Final answer: ; compatibility is agreement on the common domain; is an infinite antichain.
Proposition 5.37 (Counting conditions with a bounded domain). Let be the poset of the previous example. The number of conditions with domain contained in is
Proof. A condition with domain inside an -element set is determined by choosing its domain — a subset of size , in ways — and then a value in at each of the points, in ways. Summing over and applying the binomial theorem to gives . Equivalently, and more directly: each of the points is independently assigned one of three states — undefined, , or — giving conditions.∎
Example 5.38 (How many conditions extend a given one). Inside , fix a condition with . How many conditions have ?
Solution.
- Such a must agree with on and must have those points in its domain, since .
- The remaining points are each free to be undefined, , or .
- So the count is . Final answer: .
5.10Generic filters
The object forcing adds is not a condition but a coherent, maximally demanding set of conditions.
Definition 5.39 (Filter). is a filter if it is nonempty, upward closed ( and imply ), and directed downward ( implies some has and ).
Definition 5.40 (Generic filter). Let be a model of set theory with . A filter is -generic over if for every dense set with ,
Two remarks on the definition before any theorem. First, genericity is relative to : only dense sets that belong to must be met, and this restriction is exactly what makes generic filters possible to obtain. Second, the requirement is by definition, so the following is not a theorem but a restatement — and it is stated anyway because it is the move used dozens of times below.
Proposition 5.41 (Genericity is used by exhibiting dense sets). If is -generic over and is dense, then some lies in . Consequently, to prove that the object built from has a property , it suffices to find a set which is dense and all of whose conditions force to hold.
Proof. The first sentence is the definition of genericity applied to . For the second, suppose is dense and every guarantees of the object built from any filter containing . By genericity there is , and since the object built from satisfies .∎
The next proposition is the reason genericity is not vacuous and the reason the extension is genuinely new.
Theorem 5.42 (A generic filter is not in the ground model). Let be a poset which is separative in the weak sense that every has two incompatible extensions. If is -generic over , then .
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that . Then the set
is a member of , since satisfies enough of ZF to form the difference of two of its sets. We claim is dense. Let be arbitrary. By hypothesis has two extensions . If both were in , then, being downward directed, some would extend both, making and compatible — contradiction. So at least one , and that is an extension of lying in . Hence is dense and belongs to .
Genericity now gives . But was defined as the complement of , so . This contradiction shows .∎
Intuition. The proof is the whole trick of forcing in miniature. The ground model can describe the object it is missing — it knows the poset, it knows what genericity would mean — but any concrete candidate it produces can be diagonalised against by the dense set of conditions that refute it. The generic filter exists only from outside.
Since no generic filter lives in , one must ask whether any exists at all. For countable the answer is yes, and the proof is a direct construction.
Theorem 5.43 (Rasiowa–Sikorski: generic filters exist over countable models). Let be a poset and let be a countable family of dense subsets of . Then for every there is a filter with and for all . In particular, if is a countable transitive model of ZFC and , then a -generic filter over exists.
Proof. Build a decreasing chain of conditions. Put . Given , use density of to choose with . This is a recursion of length with a choice at each step, so it requires only countable choice, available in ZFC.
Let , the upward closure of the chain. Then:
Nonempty and contains : .
Upward closed: if , say , and , then , so .
Downward directed: if and with, say, , then and , and ; so is a common extension inside .
Meets each : and .
For the final claim, let be countable and transitive. Then has only countably many elements, so it contains only countably many dense subsets of ; enumerate them as — this enumeration lives outside , which is precisely why cannot carry out the construction itself — and apply the first part.∎
Pitfall. The enumeration of dense sets is not an element of , and it must not be. If it were, could run the construction and produce itself, contradicting the theorem A generic filter is not in the ground model. Forcing arguments are always carried out in a metatheory that sees from outside.
Example 5.44 (Building a generic filter by hand). In , take and run the construction of the theorem Rasiowa–Sikorski: generic filters exist over countable models starting from . What object does the resulting filter determine?
Solution.
- Step extends the current finite condition so that enters its domain; after steps every natural number has been assigned a value.
- The union is therefore a total function , because the conditions in are pairwise compatible functions whose domains exhaust .
- That function is a point of Cantor space, equivalently a subset of , equivalently a real number in binary.
- Final answer: the filter determines a single new real, the Cohen real .
5.11The forcing relation and the extension
We now have an object outside . The problem is to build a model containing both and and to know in advance, from inside , which sentences will hold there. Both problems are solved by names.
Definition 5.45 ( -names and the extension). A -name is a set of pairs where is a -name and ; the definition is by recursion on rank. Given a filter , the evaluation of is
and the generic extension is .
Intuition. A name is a recipe with conditional clauses: "put into me, provided turns out to be true." The ground model can write down every such recipe, because recipes are ordinary sets. It cannot evaluate them, because evaluation needs . So owns the syntax and supplies the semantics.
Proposition 5.46 (The extension contains what it should). and , and has the same ordinals as .
Proof. For , define the check name by recursion: . Then , and since for every filter, an induction on rank gives . So every is the evaluation of a name in .
For , take , a name in . Its evaluation is .
For ordinals, gives one inclusion. Conversely, an easy induction shows , so every element of has rank below the height of ; since both classes are transitive and contain exactly the ordinals of that height, their ordinals agree.∎
Definition 5.47 (The forcing relation). For , a formula and names , write
to mean: for every filter which is -generic over and contains , the extension satisfies .
Theorem 5.48 (The forcing theorem). Let be a countable transitive model of ZFC and .
- (Definability.) For each formula the relation is definable in , by a formula with as parameters.
- (Truth.) For every generic , if and only if some has .
- (Preservation.) is a countable transitive model of ZFC.
Remark (Outline, not a proof — what it assumes and where the details live). This is the technical core of the subject and cannot be proved in a chapter; what can be said is exactly what the proof does. Definability is established by defining a relation inside , by recursion on the structure of and, for atomic formulas, by a simultaneous recursion on the rank of the names: is defined in terms of dense sets of conditions putting suitable pairs into , negation is handled by "no extension of forces ", and the existential quantifier by a density clause over names. One then proves by induction that and coincide, which is the truth lemma, using the genericity of at each induction step. Preservation of the axioms is a separate verification, one axiom at a time; extensionality and foundation are inherited from transitivity, pairing and union are name constructions, and replacement and power set require the definability clause to convert an unbounded search into a bounded one. What is assumed throughout is that is a set — countable and transitive — so that generic filters exist by the theorem Rasiowa–Sikorski: generic filters exist over countable models. The full development is Kunen, Set Theory, chapter IV, or Jech chapter 14.
Proposition 5.49 (Forcing is monotone and decided by density). If and then . Moreover for every and there is with or ; consequently the set of conditions deciding is dense.
Proof. Monotonicity: any generic containing contains , since filters are upward closed and ; so the defining condition for applies to and gives .
For the second claim, suppose no forces . Let be generic with . If , the truth part of the theorem The forcing theorem gives some with , and since is directed there is with and ; monotonicity gives , as required. If instead , the same argument produces forcing , contrary to assumption. Density follows because was arbitrary.∎
Remark. The last proposition is what makes forcing a method rather than a curiosity. To show that a sentence holds in the extension, one does not inspect the extension: one shows that the conditions forcing it are dense in the ground model, a statement about a partial order that can verify about itself.
5.12Cohen forcing: adding a real
Everything above is machinery. Here is the machine doing its one indispensable job: manufacturing a set of natural numbers that the ground model does not contain.
Definition 5.50 (The Cohen poset). is the set of all finite partial functions from to , ordered by , with . Given a filter , write .
The first thing to check is that is a function defined everywhere. That is exactly a density statement, and it is the concrete heart of the whole method.
Theorem 5.52 (The domain-filling sets are dense). For each put
Then each is dense in , and each belongs to any model containing .
Proof. Let be arbitrary and fix . Two cases.
If , then itself lies in and , so has an extension in .
If , define . Since is finite, so is , and is a function because the new point was not previously in the domain. Hence , and means . Also , so .
In both cases has an extension in , which is density. Finally is definable from and by a formula with bounded quantifiers, so separation inside produces it as an element of .∎
Corollary 5.53 (The generic object is a total function). If is -generic over , then is a function from to .
Proof. is a function: any two conditions in are compatible, being members of a downward directed filter, and compatible finite partial functions agree on their common domain, so the union of has no conflicting pairs. is total: fix . The set is dense and lies in by the theorem The domain-filling sets are dense, so genericity gives , and then . Values lie in because every condition takes values there.∎
Now the payoff. The generic real is new, and the proof is three lines of density — the single most important computation in the subject.
Theorem 5.54 (The Cohen real is new). Let be -generic over and . Then for every with . Hence .
Proof. Fix with , and set
is an element of , being definable from and the poset.
is dense. Let be any condition. Since is finite and is not, choose and put . Then is a condition, , and , so .
By genericity pick , witnessed at some . Since we get , so .
As was arbitrary, is not a ground-model real. It does lie in , since for the canonical name of the corollary The extension contains what it should, and is a model of ZFC closed under unions.∎
Intuition. Why can the ground model not defend itself? Because any is a single target, and a finite condition has only finitely many commitments, so there is always an untouched coordinate where the generic can be made to disagree. The ground model has reals and the generic dodges all of them simultaneously — but it does so one dense set at a time, and each dense set handles only one . Genericity is what lets -many refutations be combined.
Example 5.55 (A dense set forcing an infinite pattern). Show that the generic real takes the value infinitely often.
Solution.
- For each let , an element of .
- is dense: given , pick outside the finite set and extend by .
- Genericity gives some , so for some .
- Since was arbitrary, is unbounded, hence infinite. Final answer: yes, infinitely often — and by symmetry the same holds for the value .
Example 5.56 (Counting the conditions of a given domain size). How many conditions in have domain of size exactly contained in ?
Solution.
- Choose the domain: ways.
- Choose values: ways.
- Total . Final answer: .
5.13The continuum hypothesis stated precisely
CH is a statement about two cardinals, and almost every confusion about it comes from misreading which two.
Proposition 5.57 (Equivalent forms of CH). The following are equivalent over ZFC:
- Every infinite subset of is either countable or of the same cardinality as .
- .
- There is a well-ordering of in which every proper initial segment is countable.
Proof. : By AC, for some , since is uncountable by Cantor's theorem. If then , and a subset of of size exactly exists (take the image of an injection from , available since ); that subset is uncountable and not of size , contradicting (1). So .
: If , transport the canonical well-ordering of along a bijection. Every proper initial segment of is a countable ordinal, hence countable.
: Let be such a well-ordering, of order type . Every proper initial segment being countable means , and is uncountable since is, so and . Now let be infinite. Under the bijection with , either is bounded in , hence contained in a countable initial segment and therefore countable, or it is unbounded, in which case it has size .∎
Pitfall. CH is not the statement — that is Cantor's theorem, provable in ZFC. Nor is it the statement that exists, which is also a theorem. CH asserts that two independently defined cardinals, the first uncountable aleph and the cardinality of the power set of , happen to coincide.
Example 5.58 (Locating CH among related statements). Classify each as a theorem of ZFC, independent of ZFC, or refutable in ZFC: (a) ; (b) ; (c) ; (d) .
Solution.
- (a) A theorem. is uncountable and by AC its cardinality is an aleph, so it is at least the least uncountable aleph.
- (b) Independent — this is CH.
- (c) Refutable: Cantor's diagonal argument proves outright.
- (d) Independent: it follows from GCH, and Easton-style forcing makes it fail.
- Final answer: theorem, independent, refutable, independent.
5.14Gödel's half: CH cannot be refuted
The inner-model half is now assembled from parts already proved plus one quoted lemma.
Theorem 5.59 (Condensation). If is an elementary submodel of for a limit ordinal , then the transitive collapse of is for some , and .
Remark (Quoted, not proved here). The proof needs the fine structure of the definition of : one shows the statement " " is expressible by a formula whose relativisation to is correct for limit , then applies the Mostowski collapse and -absoluteness. It is the one genuinely technical ingredient in Gödel's proof, and it is where the choice of rather than pays off. See Jech, Theorem 13.18.
Theorem 5.60 (CH holds in ). . Hence .
Remark (Outline using the quoted condensation lemma). Work inside , so that . Let . Choose a limit large enough that and satisfies enough of ZF, then take a countable with ; such exists by the downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. By the theorem Condensation the collapse of is some with countable, and the collapse fixes because and contains each element of . So with . Therefore
which has cardinality by the proposition Levels of have the size of their index. Combined with this gives in . The relative consistency statement then follows from the theorem The inner model method. What is assumed: condensation, and Löwenheim–Skolem inside .
Corollary 5.61 (ZFC does not refute CH). If ZF is consistent, then .
Proof. Suppose . By the theorem CH holds in the theory is consistent, so it has a model by completeness. Then , so by soundness, while also — a contradiction. Hence no such proof exists.∎
Example 5.62 (Why the argument gives GCH too). Sketch how the same method yields in .
Solution.
- Replace by throughout: given in , take an elementary submodel of size with .
- Condensation collapses to some with , hence , and is unmoved because .
- So , of size .
- Final answer: in , and is a theorem of ZFC, so GCH holds in .
5.15Cohen's half: CH cannot be proved
For the other half we force with many copies of the Cohen poset at once and then must verify that the cardinals we are counting with survive.
Definition 5.63 (The poset for CH). For a cardinal of , let be the finite partial functions from into , ordered by reverse inclusion. For put , where .
Theorem 5.64 (The columns are distinct reals). Let be generic for over . Then each is a function , and whenever . Hence .
Proof. Totality of each is the corollary The generic object is a total function applied to the dense sets , whose density is proved exactly as in the theorem The domain-filling sets are dense: a finite condition omits some only if it can be extended by assigning a value there.
For distinctness, fix and let
This set lies in . It is dense: given , its domain is finite, so choose with neither nor in — possible since only finitely many are used — and extend by setting the first to and the second to . The result is a condition below in . By genericity some lies in , and since the functions and differ at that .
So is an injection of into the reals of , giving there.∎
The inequality is worthless unless is still a cardinal in ; otherwise could collapse to and we would have proved nothing. This is what the chain condition is for.
Theorem 5.65 (ccc forcing preserves cardinals and cofinalities). If has the countable chain condition in and is generic, then for every ordinal , is a cardinal in if and only if it is a cardinal in ; likewise cofinalities are unchanged.
Remark (Outline, not a proof — what it assumes and where the details live). The engine is the following lemma, which is where ccc is used: if is a function from an ordinal into , then in there is a function with domain such that and for all . To see it, take a name and, for each , consider a maximal antichain of conditions deciding the value ; by ccc that antichain is countable, so it names at most countably many possible values, and is that countable set — which can compute by the definability part of the theorem The forcing theorem. Now if were a cardinal in but not in , there would be a surjection in with ; applying the lemma covers by countable sets inside , so in whenever is uncountable and regular, contradiction. The regular case handles the rest since cardinals are limits of regular ones. The assumptions are the forcing theorem and AC in ; details in Kunen, chapter VII.
Theorem 5.66 (Cohen's theorem, with the count). Let be countable transitive and let be a cardinal of with . Forcing with gives .
Remark (Outline, assembling the proved parts with two quoted ones). The lower bound is the theorem The columns are distinct reals, fully proved above. That is still a cardinal uses the theorem ccc forcing preserves cardinals and cofinalities, together with the fact — a -system argument on finite domains — that is ccc. The upper bound is the nice-name count: every real of has a nice name with each an antichain, hence countable by ccc; under GCH in there are at most such names when . Finally is needed so that ; the theorem König's restriction on the continuum below shows the hypothesis cannot be dropped.
Corollary 5.67 (ZFC does not prove CH). If ZFC is consistent, then .
Proof. By the theorem Cohen's theorem, with the count with , the theory is consistent, and that theory proves . If ZFC proved CH, then this consistent theory would prove both CH and CH, so it would be inconsistent — contradiction.∎
Example 5.68 (Reading off the aleph subscript). In a forcing extension satisfying , what is the subscript with , and what is the value of raised to the power in that model?
Solution.
- By hypothesis , so .
- For the second, , using cardinal exponentiation rules valid in ZFC.
- Final answer: , and the power is again .
5.16What forcing can and cannot do to the continuum
Forcing gives enormous freedom over the value of , but not total freedom. One ZFC theorem survives every extension and constrains the answer.
Theorem 5.69 (König's restriction on the continuum). In ZFC, . In particular .
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that , and write with strictly increasing. Identify the reals with the set of all functions restricted appropriately; more simply, partition a set of size as with .
Take of cardinality , say , and suppose for contradiction that with . We produce an element of outside every , contradicting the union. Since and there is a bijection of with , view each element of as a function and let be its -th row. For each , the set of -th rows of members of has size at most , so it is not all of ; choose not occurring as the -th row of any member of . Let be the function whose -th row is . Then , and for every , because and any member of differ in row . So , contradiction.
Therefore is not the supremum of countably many smaller cardinals, that is, . Since , the value is excluded.∎
Remark. The diagonal in that proof is Cantor's, performed once per row instead of once overall. That is the general shape of König's theorem, of which this is the special case .
Theorem 5.70 (Easton: the continuum function on regulars is almost arbitrary). Let and let be a function from regular cardinals of to cardinals of such that is non-decreasing and for all . Then there is a forcing extension preserving cardinals in which for every regular .
Remark (Quoted, not proved here). Easton's construction is a class-length product of Cohen-style posets with support restricted by an "Easton support" condition, and the verification that cardinals are preserved splits the product into a small ccc-like part and a highly closed part at each stage. The two hypotheses on are exactly the ZFC constraints: monotonicity of the continuum function, and König's theorem in the form , which is the theorem König's restriction on the continuum generalised. See Jech, chapter 15. Singular cardinals behave completely differently — Silver's theorem and the whole of PCF theory live there — and Easton's freedom does not extend to them.
Example 5.71 (Deciding which continuum functions are admissible). Is there a model of ZFC with and ?
Solution.
- The continuum function is non-decreasing: forces .
- Here that would require , which is false.
- Final answer: no such model exists — this is refutable in ZFC, before any forcing is attempted.
5.17Large cardinals: axioms of infinity
Forcing moves the continuum sideways; large cardinal axioms extend the universe upward. They assert that certain enormous cardinals exist, and each such assertion is strictly stronger than ZFC in a sense made precise below.
Definition 5.72 (Large cardinal axiom). A large cardinal axiom is a sentence asserting the existence of a cardinal with a closure or reflection property so strong that proves . By the corollary ZFC cannot prove its own consistency, no such axiom is provable in ZFC.
Intuition. Each axiom of infinity says the universe is closed under one more operation. The axiom of infinity itself says " exists", which is what lifts finite set theory to ZFC; an inaccessible says "a stage exists that is closed under everything ZFC can do"; a measurable says "a stage exists that can be reflected by an elementary embedding". Each is the previous demand raised one level of abstraction.
5.18Inaccessible cardinals
Definition 5.73 (Inaccessible cardinal). An uncountable cardinal is (strongly) inaccessible if it is regular — — and a strong limit: for every .
Theorem 5.74 (An inaccessible gives a model of ZFC). If is inaccessible, then .
Proof. Extensionality, foundation and choice are inherited: is transitive, so extensionality and foundation hold, and any well-ordering of a set has rank below , so it lies in .
Pairing and union: if then since is a limit ordinal; and .
Infinity: because .
Power set: if with , then — here the strong limit property is used, by induction on showing for — so and . Hence .
Separation: a subset of has rank at most that of , so it lies in .
Replacement: let be definable over with . Then , and is a set of fewer than ordinals below . Regularity of makes it bounded, say by , so the image lies in and hence is an element of .
All axioms hold, so .∎
Corollary 5.75 (ZFC cannot prove an inaccessible exists). If ZFC is consistent, then "there exists an inaccessible cardinal". Moreover does not imply provably in ZFC.
Proof. By the theorem An inaccessible gives a model of ZFC, ZFC proves "if an inaccessible exists then there is a set model of ZFC", and hence proves "if an inaccessible exists then ", using the arithmetised soundness theorem as in the corollary No absolute consistency proof for a set theory. So a ZFC proof of the existence of an inaccessible would yield a ZFC proof of , contradicting the corollary ZFC cannot prove its own consistency.
For the second claim, suppose ZFC proved that implication. Then would prove , which by the first paragraph implies — a violation of the second incompleteness theorem applied to the consistent theory .∎
Example 5.76 (Inaccessibility is not just largeness). Is inaccessible? Is ?
Solution.
- is a limit cardinal but , so it is singular, hence not inaccessible.
- is a strong limit, since , but again its cofinality is .
- Final answer: neither — both fail regularity. Inaccessibility needs regularity and strong limit, and no cardinal ZFC can name from below has both.
5.19Measurable cardinals
Definition 5.77 (Measurable cardinal). An uncountable cardinal is measurable if there is a -complete nonprincipal ultrafilter on : a family closed under supersets and under intersections of fewer than of its members, containing exactly one of and for each , and containing no singleton.
Theorem 5.78 (Measurable implies inaccessible). Every measurable cardinal is inaccessible.
Proof. Let be a -complete nonprincipal ultrafilter on .
Regularity. Suppose with and each . Nonprincipality plus -completeness gives that every set of size less than is not in : a singleton is not in , so its complement is, and intersecting fewer than such complements — legitimate by completeness — shows the complement of any small set is in . So each , that is . By -completeness the intersection is in , but that intersection is , and since is a proper filter. Contradiction, so is regular.
Strong limit. Suppose . Fix an injection from into . For each exactly one of , lies in ; call the chosen value and the chosen set . By -completeness , so is nonempty and in fact has size by the previous paragraph. But every satisfies for all , so — and was injective, forcing . Contradiction. Hence for all .
Being uncountable, regular and a strong limit, is inaccessible.∎
Corollary 5.79 (Measurables are far above the first inaccessible). If is measurable then is the -th inaccessible cardinal, and proves .
Proof. For the consistency claim: if is measurable it is inaccessible, so by the theorem An inaccessible gives a model of ZFC the set models ZFC; a standard reflection argument using -completeness shows the set of inaccessibles below is in , hence unbounded, so also believes inaccessibles exist. That provides a model of , and soundness converts a model into a consistency statement. The claim that is the -th inaccessible follows from that same unboundedness together with regularity.∎
5.20The hierarchy of large cardinals
Proposition 5.81 (The ladder is strictly increasing). If and are large cardinal axioms with , then , assuming is consistent.
Proof. Suppose . Combined with the hypothesis, proves , and a consistency statement carries with it the provable implications of the theory it is about; formalising, and together give by formalised soundness. That contradicts the theorem Gödel's second incompleteness theorem applied to the consistent theory .∎
Remark. Empirically the hierarchy is linearly ordered by consistency strength, and no one knows why. Axioms invented for unrelated reasons — from combinatorics, from infinitary logic, from the theory of elementary embeddings — always turn out to be comparable. There is no theorem saying this must happen; it is the most striking unexplained regularity in the subject.
5.21Incompleteness as the source of all of this
Theorem 5.82 (Gödel's first incompleteness theorem). Every consistent, recursively axiomatised theory interpreting arithmetic is incomplete: there is a sentence with and .
Remark (Outline, not a proof — what it assumes and where the details live). The diagonal lemma supplies with . If then proves both and its own unprovability of , contradicting consistency via provable -completeness. If then proves , from which -consistency (Rosser's refinement weakens this to plain consistency) gives a contradiction. What is assumed is the representability of recursive relations in ; see any text on incompleteness.
Proof. Any such extension is still recursively axiomatised, still interprets arithmetic and, by assumption, is consistent. The theorem Gödel's first incompleteness theorem then supplies a sentence independent of . Iterating — pass to , which is again consistent and recursively axiomatised — produces infinitely many.∎
Intuition. CH's independence is often told as a story about set theory being strange. The corollary says the opposite: incompleteness is the default for any theory that can talk about arithmetic, and the surprise is not that some sentence is independent but that the independent sentence turned out to be one mathematicians already cared about.
5.22Consistency strength as an ordering
Definition 5.84 (The consistency-strength preorder). For theories extending a fixed weak base, write if the base theory proves . Write if both directions hold, and if but not conversely.
Proposition 5.85 ( is a preorder and extensions climb it). is reflexive and transitive, and if then .
Proof. Reflexivity is the tautology . Transitivity chains two implications. For the last claim, a proof of a contradiction from is already a proof from when , so is verified by a primitive recursive transformation of derivations.∎
Proposition 5.86 (Forcing does not change consistency strength).
Proof. Each theory extends ZFC, so each by the proposition is a preorder and extensions climb it. The other direction is the theorem CH holds in for the first and the theorem Cohen's theorem, with the count for the second: each converts a model of ZFC into a model of the stronger theory, and that conversion is the content of .∎
Example 5.87 (Placing statements on the ladder). Order by consistency strength: ZFC, , inaccessible, measurable.
Solution.
- The first two are equiconsistent by the proposition Forcing does not change consistency strength.
- An inaccessible gives a model of ZFC, so inaccessible by the corollary ZFC cannot prove an inaccessible exists.
- A measurable gives a model of "ZFC + an inaccessible exists" by the corollary Measurables are far above the first inaccessible, so it is strictly stronger again.
- Final answer: , with exactly two strict jumps.
5.23What independence means for mathematical truth
Two positions dominate, and they differ about whether "the universe of sets" names one thing.
The universe view holds that there is a single intended , that CH has a truth value in it, and that ZFC is simply an incomplete description. On this reading, independence is a challenge to find the missing axioms. Gödel held it explicitly, expected CH to be false, and hoped large cardinals would decide it — a hope frustrated by Levy and Solovay, who showed that small forcing preserves large cardinals and hence that no large cardinal axiom of the usual kind decides CH.
The multiverse view, developed by Hamkins among others, holds that there are many equally legitimate universes of sets, related by forcing and inner-model constructions, and that CH is simply a parameter that varies across them, much as commutativity varies across groups. On this reading, the search for the missing axiom is a category error, and the right object of study is the network of models itself.
Remark. A third, more technical position runs through Woodin's programme: CH may be decided not by intuition but by structural criteria — maximality of the theory of , or the existence of a canonical inner model for supercompact cardinals. Woodin has argued at different times both for and, later, under the Ultimate- programme, for CH. The conclusion has not stabilised, which is itself informative.
Example 5.88 (What a new axiom must do). Why is "adopt CH because it is simpler" not accepted as a resolution?
Solution.
- Simplicity does not survive scrutiny: CH follows from forcing axioms such as MA CH and PFA, which are themselves simple to state and have wide structural consequences.
- An axiom is accepted when it is fruitful and coherent: it should decide many open questions in a uniform way, cohere with the large cardinal hierarchy, and be justified by reflection or maximality principles rather than convenience.
- Final answer: candidate axioms are judged by consequences and coherence, and on that test CH and CH both have serious support.
5.24Where the subject is now
Three programmes dominate contemporary work, and each is a direct descendant of the material above.
The inner model programme seeks canonical models, like but large enough to contain supercompact cardinals. The current target is Ultimate-: Woodin's conjecture that there is an inner model which satisfies GCH, admits a -definable well-ordering, and is compatible with every large cardinal. Two conjectures gate it — the HOD conjecture and the -conjecture — and either could fail.
Forcing axioms push in the opposite direction. MA, PFA and Martin's maximum assert that generic filters already exist in for suitable posets, making the universe as rich as possible rather than as thin. PFA implies and settles a long list of combinatorial questions; its consistency strength is around a supercompact cardinal, and pinning it down exactly remains open.
Descriptive set theory under determinacy shows what large cardinals buy at the level of definable sets: from infinitely many Woodin cardinals one proves that all projective sets are Lebesgue measurable, have the Baire property and the perfect set property. Here independence stops — the projective statements are decided, uniformly and in the direction analysts always wanted — which is the strongest existing argument that large cardinal axioms are tracking something real.
Remark. The techniques have also travelled. Cardinal invariants of the continuum, the structure of , applications to -algebras and to Banach space geometry, and Shelah's PCF theory for singular cardinals — where, remarkably, ZFC proves much more than forcing intuition suggests, such as when is a strong limit — all descend from the two constructions in this chapter.
- Saying Cohen proved CH is false. He proved . Truth is not on the table; see the proposition What an independence theorem actually asserts.
- Dropping the consistency hypothesis. "ZFC proves CH is independent" is false as stated. What is a theorem is the implication from , by the corollary ZFC cannot prove its own consistency.
- Getting the poset order backwards. means is stronger and carries more information. Reading it as "weaker" inverts every density argument.
- Forgetting that genericity is relative. must meet every dense set that lies in , not every dense set. Requiring all of them makes generic filters impossible for nontrivial posets.
- Expecting the generic filter to be in the ground model. By the theorem A generic filter is not in the ground model it never is, for any poset splitting below every condition — and if it were, the extension would add nothing.
- Confusing with . They agree for finite only. At the definable power set is countable while the real one has size .
- Assuming cardinals survive forcing automatically. They do not. Collapse forcing makes countable. Preservation is a theorem with a hypothesis — ccc, or closure — as in the theorem ccc forcing preserves cardinals and cofinalities.
- Claiming can be any cardinal. Not : the theorem König's restriction on the continuum forbids countable cofinality, and monotonicity forbids much else.
- Treating as a harmless simplifying assumption. It kills every large cardinal from a measurable up, by the theorem Scott: a measurable cardinal implies .
- Confusing independence with undecidability. Independence is about one sentence and one theory; undecidability in the recursion-theoretic sense is about an algorithm for a class of problems. The two words have separate meanings and separate theorems.